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Limited Liability and the Real World
Robert W. Hamilton*
Larry E. Ribstein**

This is not a traditional academic law review article. Rather, this
Article describes a personal debate that the two co-authors had through
electronic mail in late 1995 and early 1996. Initially, the subject of this
debate was the appropriate role of limited liability in the jungle of newly
created unincorporated business forms that have appeared in the 1990s,
but the debate rapidly expanded into a discussion of contrasting views of
the rationality of markets in American society. Because these exchanges
were by electronic mail, they are frank and uninhibited and perhaps
sometimes wander from the basic issue. However, the exchanges raise
basic issues that need to be addressed in any discussion of the future of
unincorporated business forms.
Part II of this Article represents the actual exchange of views. By
and large, the comments speak for themselves and were left untouched.
Some minor editing of this text was made to eliminate obvious typographical errors and to insert footnotes when the authors referenced other
published work. The authors also omitted a couple of observations that
seemed irrelevant or substantively wrong, but that did not go to the merits
of the debate.' The selection of the four introductory messages that were
placed on the LNET-LLC net was made solely by Professor Hamilton in
an effort to give some perspective to the debate that followed. Part III
of this Article, the Postscript, reflects comments that each author wished
to make about this exchange following the Symposium at Washington
* Minerva House Drysdale Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin
School of Law.
** GMU Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of Law. This
Article is based on an electronic mail dialogue between the authors prior to The Future of

the UnincorporatedFirm Symposium at the Washington and Lee University School of Law
on November 15, 1996.
1. This comment applies only to Professor Hamilton's comments. In one instance,
a hypothetical that was hastily thrown together did not prove the point he was trying to make
and has been eliminated.
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and Lee University School of Law and after reviewing the earlier discussions.
Each communication begins with the name of the writer, the date of
the communication, and the audience to which it was addressed.
I. Background

The genesis of this debate was a conference at the University of
Colorado in early 1995 entitled "LLCs, LLPs, and the Evolving Corporate
Form."2 During the course of this conference, a lively discussion developed among the participants (and to some extent within the audience) as
to the desirable scope of limited liability in these new business forms.
Several papers argued that limited liability should be accepted as a reasonable default form.' Professor Hamilton had prepared an article on the
development of the limited liability partnership (LLP) in Texas4 for that
symposium which defended (or at least accepted) the narrow form shield
of limited liability5 for electing LLP status. At the same time, Professor
Hamilton's article criticized the New York and Minnesota statutes that
provided a broad form shield of limited liability. 6 At the Colorado conference, several participants strongly took issue with this conclusion and
expressed the view that the shield of limited liability should be extended
to cover many business relationships.

2. Symposium, LLCs, LLPs, and the Evolving CorporateForm, 66 U. COLO. L. REv.
855 (1995).
3. See, e.g., William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and
Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1039
(1995).
4. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships:Presentat the
Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065 (1995). Professor Ribstein also prepared an
article for the Colorado symposium that dealt with statutory developments. See Larry E.
Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws andLimited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 947 (1995).
5. The narrow form shield protects innocent partners only for liabilities incurred as
a result of malpractice or wrongful conduct by other partners. The partnership itself and
the responsible partners remain liable on those claims, while all partners, innocent and guilty
alike, remain liable for all other claims and liabilities, including particularly all claims
arising out of breach of contracts.
6. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 1087-1103. The broad form shield protects partners from all personal liability for partnership liabilities except that individual partners
remain liable for tortious or other conduct in which they were directly involved. In the
scant period of less than two years, it appears that the broad form shield has become the
model for most state statutes.
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I . The Debate
Following the Colorado conference, a series of messages that considered the limited liability issue were posted on the LNET-LLC, 7 a bulletin
board for persons interested in limited liability companies and a host of
interrelated "threads." The first four messages set forth below frame the
background for the more personalized discussion that followed. Even
though the debate began with a discussion of the effect of changing default
rules for general partnerships, the debate quickly turned to more fundamental issues about the kind of society in which we live.
Robert W. Hamilton: September 12, 1995 Broadcast
on the LNET-LLC Net
I have been reading with considerable interest the recent dialogue [on
this net] about limited liability in LLPs. LLPs were invented in Texas and
I was indirectly involved in the enactment of the original statute. Last
winter, I gave a talk that considered many of the questions being discussed
on this net at the present time.' I hope that those of you interested in the
LLP problem will take the time to read that article. I might add that I do
not agree that it is good policy to extend the limitation of liability in LLPs
to general contract claims, as was done in Minnesota, 9 New York, ° and
the prototype statute, and as is now proposed below by Mark Pruner."
I do think that some definition is needed as to the scope of "vicarious"
liability for law firm managers, and the like, if these statutes are to fulfill
their original purpose, which basically was to allow innocent, nonnegligent
partners to sleep at night without concern about personal responsibility for
someone else's malpractice.
The message from Mark Pruner was as follows:
I believe that limited liability for contractual claims is much more
important for law firms than is limiting vicarious malpractice liability.
I can name several firms that had "business" problems of one sort or
another that led to their liquidation, but cannot think of any firms larger
than four attorneys that were put under by malpractice. Does anyone
know of such a firm? In small firms, attorneys are likely to be "in7. The e-mail address for the LNET-LLC bulletin board is: lnet-llc@access.usa.net.
8. See generally Hamilton, supra note 4.
9. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
10. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
11. Mark Pruner is a solo practitioner in Greenwich, Connecticut. He is also author
of A Guide to ConnecticutLimited Liability Companies (1995) and moderator of the Connecticut LLC Forum on Counsel Connect. His e-mail address is: mark.pruner@counsel.com.
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volved" with a majority of matters handled by the firm, either from a
supervisory role or by contributing substantive assistance to the larger

matters and hence will find protection from vicarious liability of little
use.
The LLP statute in Connecticut only protects firms from vicarious
liability for matters "arising from negligence, wrongful acts or misconduct... in the course of the partnership business." 2 Since most firms

do carry malpractice insurance, the large majority of these claims are
covered (excepting the deductible). Firms do not carry insurance for
downturns in business. At least in Connecticut, a firm is much better off
being a professional limited liability company (LLC) rather than [an]
LLP, since the LLC is protected from contract nomnalpractice claims as
well as from malpractice torts unless personally involved in the malpractice. 13
Robert W. Hamilton: September 20, 1995 Broadcast
on the LNET-LLC Net
As I discuss at length in my article,' 4 I think that the states that have
extended protection to partners against all contract liabilities have created
a rule that promises to cause real mischief. . ..

More basically, partner-

ships have involved unlimited liability for centuries; to change the rule
quietly, without fanfare and without warning, threatens to injure all the
relatively unsophisticated people who deal with LLPs who are unaware
that the three little letters mean that the basic rules have been reversed by
180 degrees. If partners want limited liability for contract claims, they
should negotiate for nonrecourse terms; they should not be able to compel
customers, clients, etc. (most of whom are not sophisticated and will not
know that is what they should do) to bargain for unlimited liability, which
has been the standard rule since Babylonian times.
In addition, this change is going to be viewed as a lawyers' gimmick
to cut their own personal legal obligations. Lawyers as a group are not
held in the highest esteem by many facets of society today, and I am
afraid that this will be viewed as a sneaky trick that hardly will improve
our general reputation.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-53 (West Supp. 1996). Connecticut has subsequently amended this section to provide full limited liability for LLP partners except for
liability arising from a partner's "own negligence, wrongful acts or misconduct, or that of
any person under [the partner's] direct supervision and control." 1996 Conn. Legis. Serv.
96-254 (West).
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-133.

14. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 1091-94.
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Robert W. Hamilton: September 20, 1995 Broadcast
on the LNET-LLC Net
If parties are sophisticated and transactions are substantial, it really
makes no difference what default rule is adopted: the parties presumably
will negotiate either for liability or nonliability, depending on relative bargaining power. Default rules affect unsophisticated people and routine
transactions. As discussed in my Colorado article, what bothers me is that
the states that have broadened the LLP concept have in effect reversed the
default rule without in any way considering or justifying that action 5
(except, I suspect, on the basis that a no-liability rule is clearly better than
the default rule for lawyers in partnerships). I doubt that reversing the
common-law rule leaves very much to be said for it, considering the
persons and transactions affected by it. At least the arguments in favor of
reversing the default rule that were -made at the Colorado symposium
largely were based on the argument that everyone is sophisticated and so
it really does not matter. If someone can explain why it is a good idea in
societal terms, I would appreciate hearing from them.
I also agree that an old rule is not necessarily the best rule. But I
would think that the persons seeking to change the old rule should have
the burden of explaining why the proposed new rule is better than the old.
In fact, so far as I know, that has not happened.
Larry E. Ribstein: September 21, 1995 Broadcast
on the LNET-LLC Net
I find it odd that anyone would say at this point that (1) no one has
bothered to explain why the new rule is better than the old; and (2) that
the arguments for the new rule assume everyone is sophisticated. I and
many other writers have argued extensively for broader limited liability
and have made many arguments for limited liability that do not assume
sophistication. Indeed, I sketched some such arguments in a previous
posting. One could in good faith disagree with these arguments and
attempt to refute them point by point. Or one could just decide that the
arguments are so worthless they are not worth responding to. But saying
that the arguments do not even exist is quite puzzling and does not further
the debate.

15. Id. at 1095.
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Robert W. Hamilton: September 23, 1995 E-Mail
to Larry Ribstein Only
Larry, I am sorry that my posting irritated you; I certainly did not
mean to do so. I was of course present at the Colorado symposium and
I have read much, though not all, of what you have written about limited
liability. I really think that we see the world differently. I view default
rules to be highly important because they govern millions of transactions,
and I believe that if they have worked well then they should not be
changed without really strong justification. I also think the default rule of
unlimited liability for partners, which has existed for centuries, is the
premise on which a large (but unquantifiable) number of people routinely
deal with partnerships. I think you view the world in a much more
economic-trained sense, in which presumptively all people not only try to
maximize their wealth in all transactions, but also are well informed and
act knowledgeably and rationally in their conduct. You dismiss situations
in which that is not the case on the theory either that the transaction is too
small to justify rationally the cost of doing something, or that the system
should protect only those who protect themselves by acting rationally. If
this is a misstatement of your views, please let me know. I decided to
send this message to you personally rather than over the network because
I did not want to misstate your views publicly. I would like to see your
reply. We then might agree to post both this message and your reply on
the net. Bob.
Larry E. Ribstein: September 23, 1995 E-Mail
to Robert W. Hamilton Only
Bob, I welcome your invitation to a dialogue on this issue. I do think
your message misstates my views somewhat. First, I do not think that
people are well informed and act knowledgeably. Like most economists,
I assume only that people generally act rationally, which means they take
into account the fact that they are not well informed and knowledgeable.
For example, in my article, The Deregulationof Limited Liability and the
Death of Partnership(Death of Partnership), I argue that unlimited liability may be inefficient precisely because smaller creditors are ignorant
about the true value of this liability.16

16.
ship, 70

Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulationof Limited Liability and the Death of PartnerWASH.

U. L.Q. 417, 429 (1992).
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Now that I have spent a summer researching partnership bankruptcy, 7
I am more convinced of this than ever. It follows that in a world of free
contracting, smaller creditors with little way to determine the creditworthiness of individual business owners would prefer to contract for limited liability because they more readily can determine its value.
I also have problems with your statement that I think "the system
should protect only those who protect themselves by acting rationally."
I would qualify that in many ways. First, I think default rules generally
should anticipate actual contracts. If people are really irrational, then that
is the way default rules should be. The problem is that there is much evidence that markets, which reflect the interactions of real people, are
rational. I would like to see real evidence that in a particular market,
such as legal services, people act irrationally. Second, even if some
people are irrational, markets may protect them without the aid of regulation. For example, if it is irrational for most clients or patients to deal
with minimally capitalized limited liability professional firms, then there
will not be enough of a market to sustain such firms even if some clients
or patients are irrational. Third, even if there would be a few firms who
would prey on the irrational, it may be difficult to regulate them such that
the benefits of the regulations outweigh the perverse effects on the legitimate firms. That is a problem with minimum insurance statutes.
With respect to your views on changing the rules, I question whether
most people do in fact contract in view of any liability rule. Cases in
which vicarious liability for malpractice is actually imposed are very rare.
Your point about the long-term survival of the rule is one that I generally
find persuasive and necessary to deal with. That is why I wrote the Death
of Partnership- to show that unlimited liability has survived because of
regulation and tax law, and not because of the preferences of individual
contracting parties. I am trying to nail that point down further in an
article I am working on now on the public choice aspects of liability rules
(specifically, their relation to the conflict between large-firm and smallfirm practitioners). 8
Finally, I would like to emphasize that I welcome your disagreement
and respect your views as one who has enormous expertise in business
associations. And maybe we are not as far apart as you think ....

17. See Larry E. Ribstein, The llogic and Limits of Partners'Liabilityin Bankruptcy,
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
18. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure

(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Robert W. Hwnilton: October 25, 1995 E-Mail
to Larry E. Ribstein Only
I do think that we view the world through different lenses. Perhaps
our differences may partially lie in the value we place on economic
models or in the reliance we prefer to place on such models.
For myself, I do not doubt that economic models using simplifying
assumptions permit valuable insights to be obtained about what we should
look for in the real world. I know that my own thought and my own
teaching have been significantly influenced by the writing of law and economics scholars, even though I have always been skeptical of that approach. Where I leave the train is when a scholar develops a model and
then assumes - without examination or explanation - that the model
reflects reality and that therefore certain legal or social changes are
desirable.
Most law and economics scholars assume at a minimum that people
act rationally in order to increase their personal wealth. Many economic
models further assume an absence of transaction costs and perfect foresight about things that have not yet occurred. These confining assumptions may be relaxed in some models, though often it is not clear (to me,
and possibly to the model builder himself) precisely which assumptions
have been relaxed and to what degree. Particularly treacherous are
models that assume some degree of foresight of events that may occur in
the future; economists like to talk about ex ante analysis by rational
people. I believe that real people cannot and do not approach the insights
and skill that economists assume they have in such analysis. In effect, the
designer of the model inserts his own personal views as to what he thinks
a person should do ex ante.
I start with a criticism of the assumption that persons act rationally
in economic matters. This assumption seems facially plausible when it is
stated, and it is difficult to use anecdotal evidence to disprove it. I accept
the fact that many people act rationally on most economic matters. There
is, however, a tremendous amount of irrational or unthinking behavior in
our society, and that includes many actions that might be aptly described
as economic activity. Any analysis that tries to deal with what people
actually do should take into account this irrationality.
Examples of irrational or unthinking behavior abound in real life:
(1) Some examples may perhaps be eliminated from analysis on the
theory that the behavior is not "really" economic behavior. An example
is the welfare mother with three hungry children who puts a dollar in the
church offering box presumably in order to have heavenly help in improv-
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ing her lot. Other examples include charitable gifts and individual political contributions made as a matter of principle and not to influence actual
decisions. Still other examples may be based on the fact that for some
people, convenience is more important than dollars over a fairly wide
range.
(2) In some instances, irrational behavior is based on one person's
idiosyncratic views. Economic behavior does not exist in a box independent of other human motives. I was involved in one case in which one
sibling acted economically irrationally toward his brother in connection
with the operation of an inherited business; blocking the brother was more
important than the decline in value of the business that followed. I have
no idea how common that is.
(3) One of the most important causes of irrational behavior is that
many people, nay, most people are woefully deficient in understanding the
most simple and fundamental economic concepts. I have listened to one
of my colleagues comment that he was holding a losing investment until
it rose in value to what he paid for it, and then he would unload it. Sunk
costs are not recognized for what they are by many people. I have
watched apparently sophisticated people place large amounts of retirement
funds into money market accounts "because that way I am sure it will be
there when I need it." The lessons of the 1970s and 1980s about inflation
have simply been forgotten, if they were ever learned. Even though the
desirability of diversification of investments seems obvious, people regularly load up on one stock that a friend has recommended or that they
think is underpriced. Many investors rely on chartists or stock gurus
despite the wide - but not universal - acceptance of the efficient capital

markets hypothesis (ECMH). Other common misconceptions involve the
failure to recognize or understand either the time value of money or the
time value of an option arrangement.
If people with a fair degree of sophistication make such common
mistakes in financial analysis, consider what the number of mistakes must
be for average persons, roughly one hundred IQ and a high school degree,
at best. Then consider the millions of people at the lowest economic end
of our society. One might argue, I suppose, that real adversity is a better
teacher of the value of money than a college degree, but it sure does not
explain why some people with credit cards in their pocket go to pawn
shops to raise short-term cash, or why persons with a small amount of
equity in their home prefer to borrow on credit cards rather than obtaining
a much cheaper home equity loan.
(4) A final major contributor to irrational decisionmaking is a human
failing to be optimistic - to assume that someone else will do what he
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promised to do. It is an unusually sophisticated person who considers in
advance what should happen if the other person does not do what he
promised. An average person probably does not consider at all the consequences of what should happen if the other party does not perform, or for
that matter, what should happen if he himself does not perform.
In my view, in a world in which there is a large amount of nonrational decisionmaking, fair default rules are really important. The great bulk
of people in fact rely on default rules in most or all of their transactions.
Of course, if people "cut their own deal," that deal should be enforced,
and default rules should be ignored. However, when in fact no special
deal has been cut, such as in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England 9 (a case which I taught again yesterday), I am not troubled by
the court adopting a rule of "equal opportunity" on the facts of that case.2"
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest not only that the Donahue case is
terribly wrong, but that the default rules that should be adopted are what
the parties would have agreed to had they written a contract resolving all
contingencies or that the rule should reflect the operational assumption of
successful firms. 2 This proposal seems to me to lead to completely
indeterminate results. In a negotiation in which one party is to become a
minority shareholder in a corporation controlled by the other, there are
three possible outcomes: (1) the parties might agree upon a contract that
would give the minority shareholder a right to exit on some mutually
agreeable terms; (2) the parties might find that they cannot agree on such
terms, but the minority shareholder decides to take his chances and agrees
to make the investment anyway; or (3) the parties might find they cannot
agree, and no investment is made. Each of these alternatives seems
equally plausible in the abstract. Easterbrook and Fischel select alternative (2), so far as I can see, simply by asserting that this is the right one.'

19. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
20. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass.

1975). Donahue is a well-known Massachusetts case in which a controlling shareholder of
a closely held corporation redeemed some of his shares (and transferred the balance of the
shares by gift to his children) at $800 per share while refusing to redeem shares of a
minority shareholder, the estate of a deceased employee. Id. at 510-11. The court imposed
a partnership-type fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholder and required the corporation
to give an equal opportunity to the minority shareholder to sell shares to the corporation at
the same price. Id. at 519-21.
21. See FRANKH. EAS ERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW

22. Id.

246 (1991).
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I turn now to the comments in your message of September 23 and
your analysis of limited liability for partnerships in your article, Death of
Partnership.
First, in your communication you state that unlimited liability "may
be inefficient precisely because smaller creditors are ignorant about the
true value of this liability," and from that you conclude that "smaller
creditors with little way to determine the creditworthiness of individual
business owners would prefer to contract for limited liability because they
can more readily determine its value." I have puzzled over the assumptions that underlie these statements because, to my mind, the conclusion
reached is not only counterintuitive, but also insupportable in terms of
simple common sense. If asked, smaller creditors would always prefer
unlimited liability to limited liability because they will then always have
greater security for performance when personal assets as well as business
assets are at risk. You apparently assume that smaller creditors may take
limited liability into account when they negotiate with a partnership in
setting the price for the transaction, and that the price may vary depending
on whether there is limited or unlimited liability. That is simply unrealistic. Smaller creditors normally will not be aware of whether or not a
specific business has limited rather than unlimited liability - a point you
make later on when you state, "I question whether most people do in fact
contract in view of any liability rule." Second, smaller creditors are
particularly unlikely to consider the consequences of nonperformance at
all. Finally, smaller creditors are classic examples of persons without
bargaining power - their individual arrangement is not necessary to the
survival of the firm, but the services of the firm, even though minor, may
be essential to some larger project with which the individual is involved.
Hence, typically smaller creditors are quoted a price for the goods or
services provided, and they can say yes or no, but they cannot really
negotiate.
You also state that you do not assume that "people are well informed
and act knowledgeably." I have reread portions of your article, Death of
Partnership,' and it seems to me that in fact your entire analysis of
limited liability and contract claims in that article is based not only on
assumptions that creditors have good information and relevant knowledge,
but also that they have foresight and can estimate (cc ante) events that may
occur in the future.
You argue that limited liability "may reduce owners' risk-bearing and
monitoring costs" and that "its costs to closely held firms in terms of the
23.

Ribstein, supranote 16.
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cost of credit may be even smaller."' That is because creditors determine
the benefit of unlimited liability by "a comparison of the expected value
of debt (V)under each rule," which in turn depends on the "creditor's ex
ante evaluation of (1) the probability that the firm's wealth will be dissipated or transferred out of reach before collection; (2) the probability that
the owners' wealth will be dissipated or transferred out of reach prior to
the time of collection; (3) creditor monitoring costs; and (4) collection
costs. "I You then use a hypothetical creditor planning to lend fifty
dollars to the debtor when the debtor can adopt either a limited or an
unlimited liability form.26 This seems to me to be a classic example of
making up a hypothetical that can never even be remotely approximated
in real life because it assumes a degree of knowledge and foresight that a
real person could never have.
I do think that your analysis is interesting and theoretically should
determine the cost of credit to the firm in a world of perfect knowledge
and perfect foreseeability. It should, in such a world, determine whether
the firm should choose a partnership or a limited liability form of business
with personal guarantees by some or all of the partners (because the firm
owners would know the results of the creditors' analysis). However,
everything depends on what values and probabilities you assume.
This calculation is impossible to make in real life. It requires some
knowledge about the size, type, and probability of liability that may be
incurred by the firn, the probability that the firm may distribute assets in
fraud of creditors to the owners, and the probability that owners will hide
assets from creditors, also in violation of the fraudulent transfer statutes
and quite possibly in violation of criminal fraud statutes as well. No
matter how sophisticated a creditor is, this is little more than a guess. For
someone who only assumes that the firm will perform as expected, it is
not even guessed at. Furthermore, it is no help to the owners themselves,
because the owners must choose a business form before doing business,
and they have no way of knowing how specific creditors, or creditors as
a group, will assess those variables.
What also is interesting about your analysis of contract liabilities in
Death of Partnershipis that the only type of creditors you consider are
those rational creditors with 20/20 foresight who can determine, ex ante,
what the present value of these future costs are.' You do not weigh at all
24. Id. at 428.
25. Id.

26. See id. at 428-29.
27. See id. at 428.
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the fact that most partnership creditors would (simplistically) always prefer
unlimited liability regimes if they had a voice in the matter. Of course,
creditors do not become involved in such matters in real life, because the
selection of business form for the firm is determined by the owners, and
the creditors must rely on whatever the default rules are for that specific
business form.
I also have problems with your analysis of tort liabilities, though I am
not intimately familiar with Priest's arguments about third-party insurance.' My own guess is that unlimited liability does in fact increase the
monitoring of agents by owners even with the presence of insurance. I
doubt whether the presence of insurance reduces significantly the monitoring process. The coverage of insurance is never one hundred percent;
some kinds of intentional conduct or claims may not be insurable, and
even high policy limits may be exceeded in specific cases. However, this
is an area where all I can say is that we do not now have a perfect compensation system for tort victims, and until we do, I suspect that insurance
provides more benefits to society than harms or costs.
So far as your analysis of tort cases under limited liability and unlimited liability regimes is concerned, I think your reliance in Death of
Partnershipon Robert Thompson's data29 is misplaced. The simple fact
is that Thompson's data are skewed because he uses only appellate cases,
and tort cases at that level are relatively infrequent because of settlement
practices and the existence of insurance. 30 Tort cases settle much more
often than contract cases because most tort liability is insured against, and
the third-party payer sets premium rates that permit settlement of most
cases. The number of tort cases that reach the appellate level on piercing
issues is therefore much lower than contracts cases. Further, the higher
success rates of defendants in those cases as compared to contracts cases
is also influenced by the high settlement rates in tort cases generally.
Settlement is rejected mainly in cases of doubtful liability and very large
claims.
I do agree with you that the taxation system encourages general
partnerships because the alternatives of C or S corporation taxation are
both less attractive. Unlimited liability in partnerships (which may never
arise and if it does may be insured against) is not as important in real life
28. See id. at 446 (citing George L. Priest, The CurrentInurance Crisisand Modern
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987)).
29. Id. at 449 (citing Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036 (1991)).

30. See Thompson, supranote 29, at 1046.
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as tax costs (which inevitably will arise) in many situations. I assume that
many general partnerships will adopt limited liability forms as they become available. This is because limited liability is always a benefit to the
owners and will be adopted if tax costs do not go up as a result. I do not
think that your bargaining model will prove or disprove this assumption.
Once one posits nonnegotiating or nonrational creditors, a limited liability
regime is always more attractive to owners than an unlimited liability
regime because those creditors rely on the default rule, to the extent they
rely at all, and thus the choice of a limited liability entity is always preferable, other things being equal. Creditors who consider the possibility that
the partnership will not perform may request personal guarantees and may
get them if their bargaining power is strong enough. However, most
partnership creditors will not realize that they are dealing with a limited
liability entity until it is too late. That is why, basically, I am not happy
with the
quiet change in default rules in the Minnesota type of LLP
31
statute.
The preliminary data I have seen on LLCs seem to indicate that they
are displacing S corporations and limited partnerships more than general
partnerships. However, the collection of data on general partnerships is
difficult because usually there is no filing requirement ....
Larry E. Ribstein: October 29, 1995 E-Mail
to Robert W. Hamilton Only
The following are some comments in response to your last e-mail.
People maximize their utility, but it may not be clear what this means
or that it means increasing wealth in the narrow sense of money. Utility
maximization depends on each individual's utility function, including their
belief in God or hatred for their brothers (to allude to two of your examples). In other words, "rational" economic behavior is an extremely broad
concept. One who believed in an afterlife and in a God that rewarded
good behavior on earth would be irrational if she did not try to appease
that God by putting money in the collection box.
You assert as an example of irrationality that "most people are
woefully deficient in understanding the most simple and fundamental
economic concepts." But people do not have to understand economics for
economic theories to work. For example, people have economically wise
intuitions. Also, many markets are driven by more sophisticated participants because producers know that even if there is a sucker born every
31.

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 323.14 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
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minute, they cannot successfully price discriminate between the suckers
and the sophisticates. In general, there is much evidence that markets
perform as if the actors in the market are economically astute, even if they
are not, e.g., stock price reaction to takeover defenses.
Because economic "rationality" and human conduct generally are so
indeterminate a priori, it is useful to find out how the world really operates. One way to do this is to construct a model based on certain narrow
assumptions and then see what implications this leads to or what data it
produces. The model can lead to insights if the assumptions are clear,
even if the assumptions are unrealistic. For example, Coase assumed a
world without transaction costs, not because he really believes there are
none, but only to demonstrate the role of transaction costs. For this
"unrealistic" model he received a Nobel Prize. Following in his path,
most modem law and economics scholarship focuses on the role of transaction and information costs, rather than assuming that such costs do not
exist.
You say that default rules are important "in a world in which there
is a large amount of nonrational decisionmaking." In fact, default rules
are important in a world in which people are rational and budget their time
to avoid unnecessary customized contracting.
I disagree with your Donahue example of the law and economics of
default rules. Whether that case was right or wrong, it certainly was not
applying a default rule. Rather, it was making up a new rule. I am not
satisfied with the reasoning of Easterbrook and Fischel either, as discussed
in detail in my review of their book32 and in other places, including my
takeover defenses article.33 For me, the question is simply what the
existing default rule is, as Posner reasoned in his Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc. dissent.' In Donahue, the default rules were provided by the
corporation statute, including the provision that required dissolution by
majority vote and in the absence of a buyout provision.35 If you want to
criticize "law and economics," which law and economics are you talking
about - Posner, or Easterbrook and Fischel, or me?

32. Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency, Regulation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook & Fischel's Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 254 (1992).
33. Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the CorporateContract, 78 GEO. L.J.

71 (1989).
34. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 444-52 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
35. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 504, 514-15

(Mass. 1975).
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With respect to liability rules, you accuse me of unrealistically
assuming perfect knowledge and foresight. In the first place, it is not
important to my analysis whether creditors know what the deal is or that
they negotiate over the price of credit. What matters in determining the
efficient default rule is what deal most creditors would make in light of
the constraints (including imperfect knowledge and foresight) under which
they operate.
Second, to repeat, I do not assume perfect knowledge and foresight.
The source of our disagreement is that I assume that in a world of generally free contracting (including the availability of both limited liability and
vicarious liability business forms), all else being equal, creditors would
pay more for any extra collectibility they get from owners' personal
liability. (That does not necessarily mean that credit costs are lower for
partnerships than for corporations, since all else is not equal - different
types of firms select different forms). On the other hand, you seem to
assume that creditors are not paying for unlimited liability since you say
they would always prefer it. I will always take a Jaguar over an Escort
if that is the only question. If you add that I have to pay $50,000 for one
and $10,000 for the other, my answer may change.
My question is whether creditors would want to pay this premium for
vicarious liability. I conclude that they often would not because of the
difficulty of evaluating what they are getting. If creditors must pay for the
liability protection they get, they are in effect investing in business owners
as well as firms. They would then care about payoffs from these investments. Given their imperfect knowledge and foresight, the payoff is
risky, as illustrated by my hypothetical probabilities. If, as we both say,
creditors do not have any idea what the payoffs are, it follows that your
rule of compulsory vicarious liability would force creditors to buy a pig
in a poke.
Thus, our real disagreement concerning contract creditors is over
your assumption that the price of credit does not depend on the personal
or vicarious liability rule. Why is your assumption any better than my
assumption of costly credit? As I explained above, my assumption does
not require that all, or perhaps even most, creditors know what the liability rule is, as long as there are market mechanisms that adjust the cost of
credit.
With respect to tort liability, I agree that unlimited liability increases
monitoring even with insurance. My point, relying on George Priest,36 is
36. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisisand Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
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that the resulting monitoring is socially excessive. If you have contrary
reasoning or data, let me know and I will reconsider my conclusion. But
why should your different assumption change my mind? Note for what
it is worth that I heard a partner in a large Atlanta firm say that his
malpractice insurer was not charging higher insurance rates for LLPs and
indeed believed that the LLP was a favorable development because it
focused liability and therefore incentives for care on the directly responsible partners. This is exactly the result Priest's analysis would predict.
With respect to veil-piercing, I rely on ThompsonP only to show that
the appellate courts accept limited liability in the cases they decide. This
has nothing to do with the actual imposition of liability in tort or contract
veil-piercing cases ....
Specifically with respect to LLPs, if you are merely saying that
people are being fooled by inadequate disclosure, then this is a specific
market problem that, perhaps, requires regulation if it can be shown. This
argument does not, however, support more general restrictions on the
availability of limited liability.
I hope this lengthy reply has helped to clarify some of our differences. I appreciate your taking the time to lay out your criticisms. You
have helped me focus my positions a little better.
Robert W. Hamilton: December 22, 1995 E-Mail
to Larry E. Ribstein Only
I'm now free to turn to your very interesting and thoughtful
response to my earlier message. I have the following thoughts:
(1) You say that "people have economically wise intuitions." Certainly people know that $50,000 is larger than $10,000, and most people
know that their income may be large enough to afford a $10,000 car, but
not a $50,000 car. But I really doubt that from these examples one can
assume that most people act rationally in economic matters ..

.

. People

without formal economic training often harbor basic misconceptions about
what is rational from an economic standpoint. It obviously is difficult to
determine whose point of view is more accurate on this fundamental issue;
my own anecdotal experiences and observations over some sixty years
indicates to me that irrational behavior is much more common than economists like to think.
(2) You also say that "markets are driven by more sophisticated participants because producers know that even if there is a sucker born every
37.

See generally Thompson, supra note 29.
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minute, they cannot successfully price discriminate between the suckers
and the sophisticates." I find this point more difficult to respond to
because some markets - e.g., securities markets - seem clearly to be
driven by sophisticated traders. On the other hand, there are many
markets in which price discrimination is the name of the game. An
obvious example is used cars. Even if there is a "sticker price" and a
"blue book" which one can refer to, price discrimination among suckers
and nonsuckers occurs all the time in the form of values of trade-ins, cost
of credit, cost of credit life insurance, and discounts from the sticker
price. I suspect that many people who buy used cars in fact are taken as
suckers. In the supplement to my book, Fundamentals of Modem Business, I have some information about the vocabulary of used car dealers.38
The language is colorful and indicates that a lot of price discrimination
does occur: "selling the payments," "slam dunk," "heavy turnover"
(pressuring customers by multiple employees), "low balling" (how to
screw the comparison shopper), the "Hull-Dobbs maneuver" (taking a
down payment or trade-in before the deal is set and then refusing to return
them), "stealing the trade-in," and the "puppy dog" (letting the consumer
take the car home before the price is agreed upon and then not taking it
back).39 When one rummages around in consumer credit areas, as I have,
one has great skepticism about the notion that sellers are unable to price
discriminate successfully.
(3) I do not disagree with your statement that the securities market
appears to react pretty rationally to events even though a lot of people in
the market really are not sophisticated. On the other hand, there are
explanations of stock market activity other than ECMH; I find Lynn
Stout's analysis of the stock market4° to be very plausible even though I
gather that her approach is dismissed by true believers in the ECMH as
"simply wrong." She believes that the market is primarily composed of
"holders" rather than "traders," and that there is a downward sloping
demand curve for securities because people have diverse views as to the
value of securities."' Of course, most of the money put into the market
by unsophisticated people today is in fact handled by sophisticated investors, mutual funds, trustees of retirement plans (though some of these
38. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RIcHARD A. BOOTH, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
BusiNEss 19 (Supp. 1995).
39. Id. at 19-20.
40. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?Disagreement,Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995).

41. See id. at 653.
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people are not very sophisticated), and so forth. As a result, the securities
markets may be exceptional and unusual types of markets.
(4) I do not disagree with your comment that Donahue was creating
a new default rule rather than applying an existing rule. In my view, the
new Donahue rule is a desirable default rule because it compels controlling shareholders to consider negotiating with unsophisticated investors
(such as Donahue himself, the plant manager of a small business) rather
than remaining silent and thereby taking advantage of a default rule that
is unfavorable to unsophisticated people who may not be aware of the
default rule and its implications.
(5) I think our main disagreement arises from your observation that
I assume that the change in default rules of liability when a partnership
becomes an LLP does not affect the cost of the services provided by the
partnership. It is easiest to talk about a law firm and legal services,
though obviously the same argument may be made about many other kinds
of service partnerships.
(a) You say that creditors pay a premium for unlimited liability.
I agree there may be instances when that is clearly true; whenever parties
negotiate for a nonrecourse loan the lender may well add a premium for
this kind of desirable loan (if the lender grants the loan at all). Similarly,
there are situations when lawyers and accountants in a general partnership
(GP) may negotiate for a degree of express limited liability in engagement
letters, and the like. However, these are very atypical situations, and I
suspect really not very common.
(b) The question whether creditors in effect pay a premium for
unlimited liability should be empirically verifiable. If you are right,
lawyers and law firms should reduce their rates somewhat when they
become LLPs, and the existence of this reduction should be testable using
sophisticated analysis. Alternatively, one might compare rates for a firm
that is an LLP or an LLC and one that is a GP, though comparability
would be difficult. My own guess is that if statistical evaluations of
pricing as a GP and as an LLP were made, there would be no detectable
differences. If I am right on this, your whole analysis about default rules
is based on an assumption that cannot be empirically verified.
(c) One could always ask a law firm, "Are you reducing your
rates now that you are an LLP?" My own guess is that the normal response will be, "No, we are not because the LLP election does not reduce
our operating costs or the cost of our malpractice insurance." (This is
true and sounds really convincing, but is beside the point.) Indeed, I
would be astonished, flabbergasted even, if there is any conscious reduction in fees as a result of the LLP election. If I am right on that, then my

54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687 (1997)

statement that creditors will always prefer the unlimited liability regime
needs qualification, but is basically correct. I qualify it this way (with the
word "basically") because I had not seriously considered the possibility
that some clients may be able to negotiate a downward adjustment in the
fees they pay as a result of the LLP election. But that is certainly conceivable with respect to a major client.
(d) When I wrote my earlier e-mail, I had the mindset of an
"average" law firm, whose clients were drawn from "ordinary folks" divorce, auto accidents, estate administration, workers' compensation,
criminal defense, social security claims, naturalization problems, and the
like. I find it very unlikely that these firms will reduce their fees as a
result of the LLP election. And, it is in this area where changing the
default rule of general liability is likely to work the greatest mischief.
(e) It is my impression that "ordinary folks," when they hire
lawyers, usually do not shop for prices. Rather, they rely on word of
mouth, advertising by lawyers, and chance relationships - the next door
neighbor who is a lawyer - when they try to find lawyers. That is
obviously not true today for large companies that deal with many law
firms. They are very price-conscious and may negotiate fees downward
before hiring a firm. They may solicit proposals from several law firms.
They may negotiate for novel compensation arrangements. However, I do
not think that one should generalize from this large company practice with
respect to outside legal work to the pricing practices of law firms generally.
(f) I suspect that you view the market for legal services as a
single market. The practices of large firms therefore will affect the entire
market, and all clients are in fact paying for unlimited liability in GPs.
That is conceivable, but there is no obvious mechanism by which fees
negotiated with large law firms spill over to smaller firms in smaller cities
and towns (or in large cities, for that matter).
(g) I would reconsider my position on this if you could show me
instances when firms routinely quote alternative fees, depending on whether or not they waive the protection of limited liability in LLPs or LLCs.
I regret that I waited so long to reply to your earlier message. I hope
you did not interpret silence as signifying agreement. I will be interested
in your reaction to the above. Have a happy holiday. Bob.
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Larry E. Ribstein: February 1, 1996 E-Mail
to Robert W. Hamilton Only
Now I have to apologize for taking so long to answer your December
22 message - but here goes:

(1) Are consumers irrational? Anecdotal evidence should not make
policy. The evidence is conflicting. Although there is much systematic
evidence of irrationality, which is conveniently collected in Eisenberg's
recent article,42 much of this evidence was collected in experimental
settings where nothing rode on the reactions that were measured, and
conflicts with evidence collected when subjects did have something riding
on the decision. Moreover, it is not as easy as you think to identify
irrational behavior as my last message indicated. It also is important to
be careful about bounded rationality. Most people know they are imperfect decisionmakers and compensate for this in their agreements.
(2) As I have said, even if individuals are rational, the same does not
necessarily follow for markets. See, for example, the interesting work of
Schwartz and Wilde,43 whose work is in consumer markets and not securities markets. They show that it is necessary only to have a few good
searchers in a consumer market dominated by form contracts to produce
efficient forms.
(3) Even if some markets are irrational, what should we do about it?
Regulation is imperfect. Regulators have the same sort of cognition
problems that consumers do, but have no property on the line to motivate
their decisions. Moreover, public choice theory teaches that legislators
and judges have incentives to make perverse decisions that favor dominant
players in the industry rather than consumers. You refer to Lynn Stout's
article. This article is a good cautionary example on the role of regulation. She argues that there is too much trading. 4 But what is the prescription - regulate trading? Or should we remove proscriptions on
insider trading that encourage even more useless trading by uninformed
investors?
(4) Some of these general observations apply to your comments on
LLPs:
42. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47
STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995). This article was discussed and criticized in this Symposium.
See Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuty Contractsin UnincorporatedFirms, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 537 (1997).

43. Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).

44. See Stout, supra note 40, at 622-25.
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Are consumers or legal services markets irrational? I most certainly
do not view the legal services market as one market (my article on the
regulation of law firm structure45 takes a considerably more complex view
than that). But I join with you in suspecting that rates have not adjusted
down to reflect limited liability. That would follow logically from my
conclusion in Death of Partnershipthat unlimited liability does not help
clients very much, if at all.' Death of Partnershipextends that notion to
conclude that legal regulation of law firm structure generally increases
rather than reduces lawyer-client agency costs.
Assuming the market is irrational and law firms are able to get
something for nothing, what is the legal prescription? It would seem to
follow that lawyers should not be able to limit their liability for malpractice - particularly for existing clients. But that is exactly what the law
says - and you seem to support it. But lawyers make the rules. My
point, above, is that political markets are no better than commercial
markets. In other words, your insistence on talking about "real worlds"
applies to both commercial and political markets.
I hope this message advances our discussion.
Robert W. Hamilton: March 13, 1996 E-Mail
to Larry E. Ribstein Only
I am finally getting back to our discussion of the "real world" ....

I am returning to our LLP discussion, particularly the proposal to permit
law partnerships to change the default rule of joint and several liability for
contract claims by filing a public form and adding "LLP" after the firm
name.
(2) As I previously have written, I have little problem with the
Texas 47 and Delaware s type statutes because they are pure "peace of
mind" statutes that deal only with malpractice liabilities and do not change
the default rule of partner responsibility except in unusual and rare cases.
While this is self-interest legislation on the part of law firms, it is narrow
in scope and limited in effect. My concern is with the third-generation
statutes that extend the shield of limited liability to all contract and tort
claims incurred while the LLP election is in effect.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Ribstein, supra note 18.
See Ribstein, supranote 16, at 427-38.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), § 15 (West Supp. 1997).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(b)-(c) (1993).
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(3) Because we are talking about the "real world," it may be helpful
to make explicit the real reason why the third-generation statutes are
attractive and the malpractice-only statutes are not. In the real world,
their attractiveness has nothing to do with the economics of the cost of
unlimited liability. Rather, their popularity is a result of the fact that state
and national bar committees that develop partnership statutes are overwhelningly made up of lawyers that are in private practice. And it is this
group that benefits economically from the third-generation LLP statute.
This is the anecdotal argument I now have heard at least three separate
times about why committees recommend enactment of the third-generation
form of LLP statute: "You know, these early LLP statutes do not really
address the current problems we face in modem law firms. Much more
personal liability today is being imposed as a result of improvident leases
of office space than malpractice. Besides, the early statutes really do not
do anything because we will get insurance against malpractice liability in
any case. So, if we really want to do something to protect individual
partners we have to go with the third-generation-type statute and give
partners protection against crazy leases and crazy promises to give hopedfor rainmakers large draws."
(4) Let's face it, we are talking about basically self-interest legislation that permits persons to escape from improvident contracts. To
suggest, as you appear to do, that limited liability is simply not very
important is to close your eyes to the real world. Practicing lawyers want
limited liability because it is important to them. Now, it may be, of
course, that a decision made on personal, selfish grounds without considering the interests of constituencies with adverse interests, may be economically justifiable on theoretical or practical grounds. However, the
economic justifications may readily be ex post rationalizations to justify
a decision made by other persons on purely selfish grounds.
(5) I want to address your comment about political markets. You
suggest that political markets are no better than commercial markets and
that the real world applies to both of them. That last comment is true, of
course, in the sense that political markets (really political power) obviously may really work in the real world. But that argument logically
means that anyone with political power should be free to exact whatever
tribute the owner can get, even though the net effect may be that society
as a whole is poorer. I doubt if you really mean that. Your political
market argument is basically an argument against all government. My
understanding of the law and economics approach toward government is
that it should provide an atmosphere in which commercial activity should
be unconstrained so that it is permitted to find its own level, and that
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political power should not be permitted to warp what is essentially a free
commercial and economic market.
(6) Next, I would think that default rules of long standing should presumptively be viewed as efficient rules (because if they are inefficient they
presumably would have been changed shortly after their introduction).
Thus, in order to justify a change in default rules of long standing, the
person proposing the change should have the burden to show that society
will be better off in some way with the new default rule. However, I
must say that neither you nor the various writers that endorse the change
to limited liability give a very plausible rationalization for doing so (other
than for the self-interest of practicing lawyers in avoiding the consequences of someone's mistake).
(7) With these comments off my chest, I turn to the remainder of the
critical paragraph four of your message of February 1. You first suggest
that the legal services market is probably not a single market. I agree
with that. You next state that you "suspect" that legal fees have not
adjusted down to reflect the change from unlimited to limited liability. I
also agree with that. If one looks at the market for legal services, it is
clear that there are two broad components: (1) the very sophisticated
clients dealing with large law firms (a market which I assume is efficient),
and (2) the market for legal services for "ordinary folk. " This latter
market does not appear to be efficient or rational, since many clients are
one-time users of legal services and do not comparison shop before hiring
a lawyer. I am a little uneasy about making a sharp distinction of this
nature, because obviously there is a gradation of sophistication. However,
I think the basic distinction is valid - that the unsophisticated market for
legal services is not very efficient because it largely is separate from the
influence of the large law firm market and does not obtain the efficiency
benefits of that market. The simplest explanation for why legal fees have
not come down when firms shift from a GP to an LLP is that there is no
incentive for the lawyers to pass on the cost savings to their clientele.
(8) You then justify the stickiness of legal fees by restating your
version of the conclusion reached in Death of Partnershipthat "unlimited
liability does not help clients very much, if at all" and then end with a
statement that the fact that legal fees have not come down in limited
liability states "would be logically consistent" with your conclusion that
unlimited liability does not matter very much. At the very best this is a
rationalization that a change is OK because it is not very important one
way or another. In fact, however, that thesis (which I think is wrong
based solely on the widespread interest in third-generation LLPs) tends to
prove the opposite, that the status quo should be maintained, for if it is not
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very important, there is no reason to reverse a default rule of long standing.
(9) There is another, more serious problem with your analysis in
paragraph four. To justify or rationalize the change in the default rule
from joint and several liability to no personal liability, you must look not
only at the relationship of lawyer to client, but also at the relationship of
law firm to its creditors, many of whom are not clients - for example,
landlords, suppliers, creditors, secretaries, paralegals, and so forth.
Again, one must not focus solely on the sophisticated creditor (who
presumably will respond quickly to the change to LLP status), but also on
less sophisticated ones. The shift from the traditional default rule of
unlimited liability to a rule that permits partnerships quietly to obtain the
benefits of limited liability threatens great mischief to persons in these
categories with limited sophistication and limited resources.
(10) Despite your earlier comments about the general unimportance
of unlimited liability, we do know that unlimited liability in small business
ventures is important in many contexts from our experience with small
corporations, where the default rule of limited liability has been in effect
for more than one hundred years. Sophisticated creditors routinely refuse
to deal with corporations unless the true owners guarantee the performance
of the corporation. Why do some people not protect themselves when
dealing with marginal corporations? For some sophisticated creditors it
may not be worth getting a personal guarantee either because the transaction is so small as not to justify the expense or because the person has a
different way of protecting himself from default, e.g., by repossessing
property or by being able to set prices high enough in repetitive transactions to cover predictable defaults. However, many creditors lack the
economic power to demand anything from the corporation, and they
consciously or unconsciously assume the risk of default. Finally, other
creditors may lack the basic sophistication to know that there is a credit
risk when dealing with a corporation, or they may not even consider the
possibility of a default. This last category is definitely not a null set,
though it is ignored in the reasoning of most law and economics scholars.
(11) If we transfer these groups of creditors into the LLP context, it
is clear that some creditors will protect themselves almost immediately
when an LLP election is made while many others will not. Some of those
that do not may be indifferent because they have taken independent steps
to protect themselves. The remaining groups are always worse off as a
result of the LLP election because the market in which they are acting is
not efficient and there is no pricing mechanism that compensates them for
the loss of protection they have from unlimited liability. What is the
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social benefit of allowing lawyers to take advantage of less sophisticated
or less vigilant creditors in various types of markets? The theoretical
arguments that there are benefits of limited liability generally are not very
persuasive in this context because those arguments assume full knowledge
and rational action by creditors, while the device that is being used here
is potentially misleading to many people. Also less misleading devices such as personal corporations and LLCs - are readily available.
(12) You may recall that a few months ago there was a discussion by
primarily practicing lawyers on the LNET-LLC net about what kind of
notice a general law partnership should give to clients, suppliers, and
creditors after electing to be an LLP under a third-generation statute. As
I recall, you contributed an e-mail on that subject. That discussion was
very revealing to me because lawyers creating LLPs for themselves were
well aware that there was a real risk that what they were doing was
misleading and were struggling to say enough to avoid claims of fraud but not to say too much.
III. Postscript
This ended the original electronic debate. We both had probably
reached the point where we realized that neither was going to persuade the
other and concluded that indeed we really did have entirely different
visions of the real world. Certainly, Larry Ribstein has not had a change
in heart. His most recent proposal is that the legal system should create
a "limited liability thing" (LLT) that would permit any individual to obtain
the benefits of limited liability simply by making a single filing with some
central authority. This proposal is a rational extension of the views of
Professor Ribstein set forth above. In effect, his proposal would reverse
the default rule of personal liability for everyone who bothers to make the
filing. Presumably, LLTs would relate to businesses or at least to
property-related transactions (though that is not entirely clear).
Given the views expressed in the above debate, it should be no
surprise that Professor Hamilton views this proposal as a terrible idea. In
his view, in a world with many opportunistic people trying to make a buck
in any way possible, and with many more unsophisticated and not always
rational people dealing with them, the idea that one could quietly slide a
limited liability entity into most interpersonal relationships is an open
invitation for fraud or worse.49 It should be added that the LLT idea has
49. For example, a person might create an LLT with, say, $100 of assets and then
execute a lease as a tenant which includes a promise by the tenant to pay rent each month.
If the landlord fails to notice that the tenant executed the lease as an LLT, the tenant could
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been extensively aired on the LNET-LLC net and these discussions will
eventually be published in some other format. However, this proposal
also demonstrates the competing views of the real world expressed here.
As part of the final editing of this exchange, the following concluding
comments were added by the authors after the Symposium at Washington
and Lee University School of Law.
Comments of Lany Ribstein
I want to begin my final comments by responding to two points that
I did not have a chance to respond to in the e-mail exchange. First, my
comment about political markets is not a call for an end to government,
but simply an often repeated point that finding a market failure is not
enough to justify government action if the government could not do any
better.
Second, I think that Professor Hamilton has misunderstood my
proposal for LLTs. This is not a significant extension of limited liability
vis-A-vis third parties, but rather is simply a way to obtain limited liability
without the baggage of unwanted default rules that apply to the parties to
the firm. In Professor Hamilton's example, because the LLT is created
by a filing, the tenant's existence as an LLT would be no different from
the landlord's standpoint from the tenant's forming an LLC or other type
of limited liability business entity.
More generally, it is important to define the issues in this debate.
The debate did not deal with whether limited liability should be allowed
for some types of firms or whether vicarious tort liability should be
mandatory in some settings. Rather, it dealt only with whether the limited
liability option should be expanded given the defects of some types of
voluntary creditors. My arguments about enforcing such contracts are
similar to those in my fiduciary duty waiver article, Fiduciary Duty
Contracts in UnincorporatedFirms, which is also a part of this Symposium.5" If anything, the arguments against enforcing contracts are even
weaker in this setting than those regarding fiduciary duties because it is
harder to make norm-based nonefficiency arguments regarding limited
liability. Indeed, I do not interpret Professor Hamilton to be making any
such arguments.

live in the apartment without paying rent and then "walk," limiting his responsibility to
$100.
50. See generally Ribstein, supranote 42.
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Moreover, even if there are reasons for not enforcing contracts, one
who makes such arguments must also specify where to draw the line. For
example, if law firms must offer their clients vicarious liability, must they
also charge a reasonable price for this protection? More broadly, if we
will not let people enter into contracts limiting the liability of the people
with which they deal, why do we let them do far more important things
whose costs and benefits may not be obvious to the unsophisticated such as getting married, getting divorced, having children, having abortions, joining the military, and voting?
Comments of Robert Hamilton
I agree with the first of Professor Ribstein's points that "finding a
market failure is not enough to justify a government action if the government could not do any better."
With respect to Professor Ribstein's second point, his comments
simply restate the disagreement between us. I have no problem with
parties allocating risks by express agreements to that effect. But what
Professor Ribstein is calling a contract is often not an express contract at
all; it is a device that permits terms to be imposed by one party on another
party without discussion, negotiation, bargain, or awareness.
We should not create devices that make it easy for persons to unilaterally change long-standing liability default rules. If, in my example, the
tenant wishes to limit his personal liability under the lease to $100, he can
always do so simply by advising the landlord of that fact before signing
the lease. The landlord can then decide whether or not to lease to the
tenant on those terms. The tenant should not be able to limit his personal
liability simply by signing his name followed by the initials "LLT."
Final Comment by ProfessorRibstein
Although of course I could have responded to these comments, I
decided that it was time to end the discussion and let readers mull the
authors' positions.
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